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1 Introduction
We consider a general class of two-sided (many-to-one) matching markets, so-called
matching with contracts markets (Hatﬁeld and Milgrom 2005; Hatﬁeld and Kojima
2008).1 The matching with contracts model contains classical marriage markets (e.g.,
Gale and Shapley 1962), college admissions markets (e.g., Roth 1985), job matching
markets (e.g., Kelso and Crawford 1982),2 and certain auction markets (e.g., Milgrom
2004).Throughout thearticle,withoutlossofgenerality,wemodelamatchingmarket
with contracts as a medical job market consisting of two ﬁnite and disjoint sets of
agents,whichwerefertoasdoctorsandhospitals.Furthermore,thereisasetofbilateral
contracts between doctors and hospitals that specify the employment conditions (e.g.,
salary, job proﬁle, retirement plan, etc.). The agents’ strict preferences over (feasible,
legal, etc.) sets of contracts or allocations completes the description of a matching
market with contracts.
In many centralized labor markets, clearinghouses are most often successful if they
produce stable allocations (e.g., Roth 1984a, 1991; Roth and Xing 1994). Loosely
speaking, an allocation is “stable” if it is individually rational [each doctor (hospital)
ﬁnds the respective contract(s) acceptable] and satisﬁes no blocking [no hospital can
blocktheallocationbyofferinganalternativesetofcontractsthatitselfandalldoctors
involved in the new contracts prefer]. It is well-known that for matching markets with
sufﬁcientsubstitutabilityinstabilitiescanberuledout:forone-to-oneandmany-to-one
matching markets without money see Gale and Shapley (1962) and Roth (1985), for
many-to-one matching markets with money see Kelso and Crawford (1982), and for
many-to-many schedule matching see Alkan and Gale (2003). For matching markets
with contracts Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) prove that substitutability of hospitals’
preferencesissufﬁcienttoguaranteestability.Inotherwords,ifhospitals’preferences
are substitutable, then the stable correspondence that assigns to each matching market
with contracts its set of stable matchings is well deﬁned.3
In order to solve a matching problem and determine a stable allocation a central-
izedclearinghousewouldneedtoknowallagents’preferences.Anappealingstrategic
property for solutions that requires that no agent can ever beneﬁt from misrepresent-
ing his/her preferences is strategy-proofness, i.e., truth-telling is a weakly dominant
strategy for all agents. Unfortunately, there exists no strategy-proof (single-valued)
solution that always assigns stable allocations (Roth 1982). Phrased differently, sta-
ble allocations cannot be reached through weakly dominant “truth-telling equilibria,”
i.e., truth-telling is not always a weakly dominant strategy for all agents in the direct
revelation game. The next question that naturally arises is whether there is another
1 Roth (1984b) considers a more general many-to-many job-matching model with contracts.
2 Roth and Sotomayor (1990) give a comprehensive and complete survey of these and related two-sided
matching models up to 1990.
3 For many-to-one matching markets with substitutable preferences (e.g., matching with contract markets
àl aHatﬁeld and Milgrom 2005, or the subclass of many-to-one matching markets included in the set of
many-to-many job-matching markets considered by Roth 1984b) the set of stable matchings equals the
core. For many-to-many matching markets with substitutable preferences the core may be empty and the
relation between the core, the set of stable matchings, and the set of pairwise stable matchings is more
complex (see for instance Echenique and Oviedo 2006; Klaus and Walzl 2007).
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way to obtain stable allocations through strategic interaction, a question that is at the
heart of the theory of implementation (for recent surveys see Jackson 2001; Maskin
and Sjöström 2002). A mechanism consists of a collection of strategy spaces (one for
eachagent)andanoutcomefunction,whichassignstoeachproﬁleofchosenstrategies
a feasible allocation. Together with agents’ preferences, which are used to evaluate
such allocations, we obtain a game in strategic form. Then, to Nash implement the
stable correspondence means that the set of allocations induced by all Nash equilibria
coincides withthesetofstableallocations. Notethat “payoffs” intheabove games are
reachedintwosteps:ﬁrsttheoutcomefunctiondeterminesanallocationandtheneach
agent evaluates the allocation using individual preferences. Thus, the mechanism can
besetupindependentofagents’(true)preferencesandthereforeacentralizedclearing-
housewouldnothavetohaveanyparticularinformationabouttheinvolvedagentsand
their preferences. In his seminal paper Maskin (1977, 1999) introduced a necessary,
but not sufﬁcient, condition for Nash implementability: (Maskin) monotonicity.F o r
economies with at least three agents, Moore and Repullo (1990) formulated a neces-
sary and sufﬁcient condition for Nash implementability: monotonicity in combination
w i t haw e a kno veto power requirement (see Maskin 1999).
For two-sided marriage and college admissions markets, Kara and Sönmez (1996,
1997) show that the stable correspondence is Nash implementable. Sönmez (1996)
obtains a corresponding implementability result for so-called generalized matching
markets; a class of one-sided matching problems that include marriage and roommate
markets(GaleandShapley1962)aswellashousingmarkets(ShapleyandScarf1974).
Inarecent paper, Ehlers(2004) obtains positive implementation resultsingeneralized
matching markets when agents are allowed to have weak preferences. Apart from the
Nash implementability of the stable correspondence, all mentioned articles discuss
stability in relation to monotonicity, Pareto efﬁciency, and individual rationality.
In the present article, we focus on Nash implementability of the stable correspon-
dence in matching markets with contracts. The stable correspondence is monotonic
(Theorem 1). Moreover, any Pareto efﬁcient, individual rational, and monotonic
solution is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). The latter result
implies that the stable correspondence is the smallest possible monotonic solution
(Corollary 1), which implies that by Maskin’s fundamental result it is impossible to
implement any subcorrespondence (e.g., single-valued) of the stable correspondence.
Finally, by verifying Moore and Repullo’s (1990) “condition µ” we prove that the
stable correspondence is Nash implementable in matching markets with contracts
with more than two agents (Theorem 3). Theorem 4 complements Theorem 3 by
showing that the implementation of stable two agent contracts (the two agent case) is
not possible. Finally, apart from obtaining various monotonicity and implementation
results concerning the stable correspondence in matching with contracts markets, we
also provide an alternative proof technique for the Nash implementability result. To
be more precise, all previous papers that demonstrate implementability of the stable
correspondence in various matching models (Kara and Sönmez 1996, 1997; Sönmez
1996; Ehlers 2004)u s eYamato’s (1992) “essential monotonicity” of the stable cor-
respondence. We apply Moore and Repullo’s (1990) implementability condition and
show that alternatively monotonicity and a particular no veto power property of the
stable correspondence assures its implementability (see Sect. 4 for further details). In
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addition, we prove that Kara and Sönmez’s (1997) results for many-to-one matching
markets with responsive preferences still hold on the larger domain of substitutable
preferences (a domain of which it is known that various results concerning stable
matchings that hold for many-to-one matching markets with responsive preferences
do not hold; see for instance Martínez et al. 1991).
2 Matching markets with contracts and stability
2.1 Doctors, hospitals, and contracts
We consider a model, in which doctors are matched to hospitals. Let D denote the
ﬁnite set of doctors, H the ﬁnite set of hospitals, and N = D∪ H the s e to fa l la g e n t s .
By d we denote a generic doctor, by h a generic hospital, and by i, j generic agents.
To model the typical feature of a job-matching market, we assume that each doctor
can be matched to at most one hospital, whereas each hospital may be matched to
several doctors. A (bilateral) contract speciﬁes a match between one doctor and one
hospital and further terms of employment such as, for instance, salary, working time
and schedule, social beneﬁts, or a combination of these and additional contract terms.
Formally, the set of contracts is described by a ﬁnite set X together with a mapping
µ = (µD,µH) : X −→ D × H that speciﬁes the bilateral structure of each contract.
So, for any contract x ∈ X, µ(x) = (d,h) means that contract x is established
between doctor d and hospital h. Note that for two contracts x,x  ∈ X,x  = x , with
µ(x) = µ(x ), x and x  specify different terms of employment for the same doctor in
the same hospital.
Ifallhospitalsofferthesamesetofemploymentspeciﬁcations K toalldoctors,then
the set of contracts X can be represented as a Cartesian product X = D× H ×K with
µbeingtheprojectionon D×H.Anexampleofsuchanemploymentspeciﬁcation K
would be a salary scale that by law has to be employed by all hospitals. However, note
that hospitals may not necessarily use the same employment speciﬁcation: a public
hospitalmaynotbeabletoofferthesamesalariesandsocialbeneﬁtsasaprivateclinic,
but on the other hand it may offer employment in ﬁelds of specialization that cannot
be offered by a private clinic. Furthermore, not all hospitals need to offer the same
employmentspeciﬁcationstoalldoctors,forinstancebecausehospitalsconditiontheir
employment speciﬁcations on the doctors’ qualiﬁcations. Also, we do not assume that
µ is surjective. Thus, a doctor d might not have any contract with some hospital h,
for instance, because his ﬁeld of specialization does not qualify him for any position
offered by h. For each doctor it is always possible to reject any contract, that is to
stay unemployed. We denote such a null contract by ∅. For each hospital it is always
possible to reject any set of contracts, that is to keep positions vacant. We refer to the
speciﬁc situation in which a hospital does not employ any doctors as a null contract,
denoted by ∅.
2.2 Doctors’ and hospitals’ preferences
For d ∈ D let Xd := µ−1
D (d) be the set of contracts in which doctor d is matched to
somehospital,i.e.,whicharefeasiblefordoctord.Eachdoctord ∈ D hasapreference
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relation Rd overfeasiblecontracts,whichisatotalorderover Xd∪{∅}.4 Alternatively,
we interpret doctor d’s preferences over Xd ∪{ ∅ }as preferences over doctor d’s sets
of feasible contracts Xd := {{x}|x ∈ Xd ∪{ ∅ } }.
Recall that ∅ can either describe the null contract or the empty set. Hence, the
feasiblecontractsetXd ={ ∅ }containsonefeasiblecontractwhilethefeasiblecontract
set Xd =∅is empty. We will simplify notation by allowing for the notation “∅”e v e n
though we mean “{∅}”—since the null contract is always available to any agent no
confusion should arise.
For h ∈ H let Xh := µ−1
H (h) be the set of contracts in which hospital h is matched
to some doctor. No hospital h is allowed to have more than one contract with a doctor
at the same time. Therefore, we deﬁne the sets of feasible contracts for hospital h by
Xh :=

X  ⊆ Xh | for all d ∈ D, |X  ∩ Xd|≤1

. Note that X  ∈ Xh implies for all
Y  ⊆ X , Y  ∈ Xh. Each hospital h ∈ H has a preference relation Rh over sets of
feasible contracts, which is a total order over Xh.
To summarize, any agent i’s preference relation can be represented by a total order
Ri over Xi.B yPi we denote the asymmetric part of Ri. Hence, given a,b ∈ Xi,
aP i b means that a is strictly preferred to b, i.e., aR i b and a  = b. Furthermore,
aR i b means that a is weakly preferred to b, i.e., aP i b or a = b. We denote the set
of all possible total orders for agent i by Ri. Since preference relation Ri ∈ Ri is a
total order, it induces a well-deﬁned choice correspondence Ci : 2X  ⇒ Xi ∪{ ∅ }
that assigns to each set of contracts X  ⊆ X agent i’s most preferred feasible set
of contracts available for it in X  ∪{ ∅ } , i.e., Ci(X ) ⊆ Xi, Ci(X ) ∈ Xi, and for
all Y ⊆ Xi, Y ∈ Xi, Ci(X ) Ri Y. Since Cd(X ) is single-valued, we alternatively
identify the set Cd(X ) with its unique element. We write CD(X ) :=

d∈D Cd(X )
and CH(X ) :=

h∈H Ch(X ).






2.3 Matching markets with contracts, allocations, and solutions
Since the set of contracts X and the set of agents N remain ﬁxed throughout this
study, we can denote a matching market (with contracts)b yapreference proﬁle R =
(Ri)i∈N ∈

i∈N Ri. We denote the set of all preference proﬁles by R =

i∈N Ri.
If not otherwise speciﬁed, we denote the associated proﬁle of choice correspondences
for R ∈ R by (Ci)i∈N.
For any subset of contracts Y ⊆ X,l e tYi := (Y ∩ Xi) denote the set of real
contracts available for agent i in Y.I fYi =∅ , then only the null contract is available.
4 A total order over a set M is a binary relation R that satisﬁes antisymmetry (for all a,b ∈ M,i faRb
and bRa ,t h e na = b), transitivity (for all a,b,c ∈ M,i faRband bRc ,t h e naRc ), and comparability
(for all a,b ∈ M, aRbor bRa ).
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An allocation is a set A ⊆ X of contracts such that for all agents all sets of contracts
available in A are feasible, i.e., for all agents i ∈ N, Ai ∈ Xi. In particular, Ad ∈ Ad






of allocations by A. Clearly, all preference relations Ri induce weak preferences over
allocations in a natural way. We use the same notation for preferences over feasible
contracts/contractsetsandallocations:forallagentsi ∈ N andallocations A, A  ∈ A,
AR i A  if and only if Ai Ri A 
i.
Asolutionϕ isacorrespondenceϕ : R  ⇒ Athatassignstoeachmatchingmarket
R a set of allocations ϕ(R). Next we discuss two basic properties for solutions: Pareto
efﬁciency and individual rationality.
An allocation A ∈ A is Pareto efﬁcient for matching market R ∈ R if there is no
other allocation A  ∈ A such that for all i ∈ N, A  Ri A and for some j ∈ N, A  Pj A.
A solution ϕ is Pareto efﬁcient if it only assigns sets of Pareto efﬁcient allocations.
Since all contracts are based on voluntary participation, at any allocation A ∈ A
each agent i who is assigned a set of real contracts Ai  =∅can reject some or all
contracts in Ai. Thus, an allocation A ∈ A is individually rational for matching
market R ∈ R if for all i ∈ N, Ci(A) = Ai or alternatively, CD(A) = CH(A) = A.
A solution ϕ is individually rational if it only assigns sets of individually rational
allocations.
2.4 Stability: stable matchings and substitutable preferences
As described in Sect. 1, an important criterion for an allocation to be accepted as ﬁnal
outcome in a job-matching market is stability. Consider a matching market R ∈ R.
First, since the matching markets we consider here are based on voluntary partici-
pation, a necessary condition for allocation A to be stable is individual rationality:
(IR) CD(A) = CH(A) = A.
Second, given that allocation A is individually rational, we assume that no hospital
can block allocation A together with a set of doctors, i.e., there is no alternative set
of contracts X  ∈ Xh such that X  Ph Ah and for all doctors d ∈ D that are being
offered a new contract x 
d with hospital h, x 
d Pd Ad. Using the associated proﬁle of
choice correspondences, “no blocking” of hospitals can be expressed as: there is no
hospital h and no set of contracts X  ∈ Xh, X   = Ah, such that Ch(A ∪ X ) = X 
and for all doctors d ∈ D that are being offered a new contract x 
d with hospital
h, Cd(A ∪ X ) = x 
d. Note that for all doctors d ∈ D that are being offered the
same contract or that are not being offered a contract in X , by individual rationality,
Cd(A ∪ X ) = Ad. Thus,

d∈D Cd(A ∪ X ) ⊇ X . Hence, we can formulate no
blocking by hospitals comprehensively as follows.
(NB) There is no hospital h and set of contracts X  ∈ Xh, X   = Ch(A), such that
X  = Ch(A ∪ X ) ⊆ CD(A ∪ X ).
An allocation A ∈ A is stable if it is individually rational (IR) and no hospital can
blockallocation A togetherwithasetofdoctors(NB).By S(R) ⊆ Awedenotetheset
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of stable allocations for matching market R. It is a standard observation in (many-to-
one)matchingtheorythatstableallocationsareatthesametimecoreallocationsinthe
sensethatnocoalitionofhospitalsanddoctorscanﬁndanotherallocationthatcontains
contracts between members of the coalition that they all weakly and some strictly
prefer. Thus, similarly as in other matching models, the core equals the set of stable
matchings. The stable correspondence S : R  ⇒ A assigns to each matching market
R the set of stable matchings S(R). Note that for the general domain of matching
markets speciﬁed so far stability is not guaranteed, i.e., there exist matching markets
R ∈ R with S(R) =∅(see Hatﬁeld and Milgrom 2005, Theorem 5). Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom (2005) prove that the set of stable matchings is non-empty if all hospitals’
preferencesaresubstitutable;looselyspeaking,ahospitalhassubstitutablepreferences
if it does not consider complementarities in the sets of contracts it can offer. To be
precise, the substitutable preference condition states that if a contract is chosen by a
hospital from some set of available contracts, then that contract is still chosen by the
hospital from a smaller set of available contracts that include it. Formally, hospital h’s
preferences Rh are substitutable if
(SUB) for the associated choice correspondence Ch and all sets of contracts
X  ⊆ Y  ∈ Xh, X  ∩ Ch(Y ) ⊆ Ch(X ).
Equivalently one can formulate substitutability as follows (see Hatﬁeld and Milgrom
2005). If a contract is not chosen by a hospital from some set of available contracts,
then that contract is still not chosen by the hospital from a larger set of available
contracts. For any set of contracts X  ∈ Xh, NCh(X ) := X \Ch(X ) denotes the set
of all contracts that are not chosen from set X  by choice correspondence Ch. One can
easily prove that condition (SUB) is equivalent to the following condition (SUB’).
(SUB’) For all sets of contracts X  ⊆ Y  ∈ Xh, NCh(X ) ⊆ NCh(Y ).
HatﬁeldandMilgrom(2005)showedthatthesetofstablematchingsisnon-emptyif
hospitals’preferencesaresubstitutable.Sinceforourlaterresultsthenon-emptinessof
the stable correspondence is important and substitutability is a reasonable assumption
for many matching markets, from now on the domain of substitutable preferences is
our reference domain.5
3 Monotonicity and Nash implementation
So far we have described all ingredients for the implementation environment, which
is given by the set of agents N, the set of alternatives (allocations) A, and the set
of preference proﬁles R. Before focusing on the Nash implementability of the stable
correspondence,weconsideranecessaryconditionforNashimplementability(Maskin
1999) that in itself has a normative appeal: (Maskin) monotonicity.
5 Itiscurrentlyanopenproblemwhichconditionsonpreferencescharacterizeamaximaldomainonwhich
thestablecorrespondenceisnonempty.HatﬁeldandKojima(2008,Example1)demonstratethatthedomain
of substitutable preferences is not maximal as suggested by Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005, Theorem 5).
Furthermore, they present a weakening of the substitutes condition that is necessary to guarantee existence
of a stable allocation (Hatﬁeld and Kojima 2008, Proposition 1); more precisely, if contracts are not weak
substitutesforahospital,thenthereexistpreferencesofotherhospitalswithsinglejobopeningsanddoctors
such that no stable allocation exists.
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3.1 Monotonicity
Before introducing monotonicity, we need some standard terms and notation. For any
agent i ∈ N, preference relation Ri ∈ Ri, and allocation A ∈ A,t h elower contour
set of Ri at A is Li(Ri, A) := {A  ∈ A | AR i A }.
Next, we deﬁne monotonic transformations. Loosely speaking, for any preference
proﬁle R and any allocation A, if at a preference proﬁle R  all agents i ∈ N consider
their allotment Ai to be (weakly) better, then R  is a monotonic transformation of R at
A.Formally,forpreferenceproﬁles R, R  ∈ Randallocation A ∈ A, R isamonotonic
transformation of R at A if for all i ∈ N, Li(Ri, A) ⊆ Li(R 
i, A).B yMT(R, A)
we denote the set of all monotonic transformations of R at A. For agent i ∈ N,
preference relation R 
i ∈ Ri, and preference proﬁle R ∈ R, we obtain preference
proﬁle (R 
i, R−i) by replacing Ri at R by R 
i.B yMT i(R, A) we denote the s e to fa l l
unilateral monotonic transformations of R at A, i.e., monotonic transformations of R
at A of the speciﬁc form (R 
i, R−i).
A solution ϕ is monotonic if an allocation A that is chosen at preference proﬁle R
is also chosen at a preference proﬁle R  where A is considered (weakly) better by all
agents. Formally, a solution ϕ is monotonic if for all preference proﬁles R, R  ∈ R,
A ∈ ϕ(R)and R  ∈ MT(R, A)imply A ∈ ϕ(R ).Asdiscussedinthenextsubsection,
monotonicityisoneofthekeyconceptsinimplementationtheory.Here,weﬁrstfocus
on the implication that monotonicity has on solutions.
Assume that for a matching market R ∈ R, a given allocation A ∈ A and some set
of contracts X  ⊆ X, some agent j ∈ N considers the contract or the set of contracts
Aj to be optimal in A ∪ X , i.e., Cj(A ∪ X ) = Aj. Then, Aj becoming even better
accordingtoagent j’spreferencesimpliesthat Aj isstilloptimalfor j.Inotherwords,
if Aj is chosen from A ∪ X  by agent j at the original preferences Rj, then Aj is still
chosen by j after a monotonic transformation of Rj. We summarize this useful fact
in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let R ∈ R,j∈ N, A ∈ A, and X  ⊆ X be such that Cj(A ∪ X ) =
Aj. Then for R  ∈ MTj(R, A) and agent j’s associated choice correspondence C 
j,
C 
j(A ∪ X ) = Aj.
Theorem 1 The stable correspondence S is monotonic.
The proof consists of showing that the correspondences of allocations satisfying (IR)
and (NB), respectively, are monotonic and hence, so is the stable correspondence as
it is the intersection of the two. For details, we refer to Haake and Klaus (2008).
Observe that we do not have to employ any restrictions on hospitals’ preferences in
the proof of Theorem 1. Hence, Theorem 1 is valid for the general preference domain,
but also applies to our standard domain of matching markets where hospitals always
have substitutable preferences. In addition, Theorem 1 is valid for any other non-
empty preference domain for which the stable correspondence is well deﬁned (i.e.,
non-empty).
Theorem 2 If solution ϕ is a Pareto efﬁcient, individually rational, and monotonic
correspondence, then ϕ ⊇ S, i.e., for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊇ S(R).
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Webrieﬂycommentonthebasicideaoftheproof,whichcanbefoundintheAppendix.
To see that Theorem 2 is true, we start with an arbitrary matching market R a n das t a -
ble allocation A ∈ S(R). Next, doctors’ and hospitals’ preferences are monotonically
transformed at A t oap r o ﬁ l e ¯ R so that R ∈ MT( ¯ R, A). However, at ¯ R, A is the only
individual rational and Pareto optimal allocation, thus A ∈ ϕ( ¯ R). By monotonicity of
ϕ, we obtain A ∈ ϕ(R), and hence, ϕ(R) ⊇ S(R).
Note that in the proof of Theorem 2 we assume hospitals’ preferences to be sub-
stitutable. In the construction of preference proﬁle ¯ R in the proof, special care has
to be taken to guarantee that hospitals’ preferences at ¯ R are again substitutable. In
addition, Theorem 2 is valid for any other non-empty preference domain for which
the stable correspondence is well-deﬁned and for which the domain is closed with
respect to the monotonic transformations needed in the proof. In particular, Kara
and Sönmez (1997) prove the equivalent of Theorem 2 for the domain of responsive
preferences in college admissions problems (without contracts). Responsiveness is a
stronger condition than substitutability and therefore generates more structure on the
matching market. In the case that the college admission problem is formulated as a
matching market with contracts, the transformation used in the proof of Theorem 2
preserves responsiveness. However, in the presence of contracts, the construction is
more involved, as agents now have preferences over a possibly much larger set of
feasible matches/contracts.
An immediate implication of Theorem 2 is that no strict selection from the stable
correspondence is monotonic.
Corollary 1 Let ϕ ⊆ S, i.e., for all R ∈ R, ϕ(R) ⊆ S(R).I fϕ is monotonic, then
ϕ = S.
Particularly, the well-deﬁned (see Hatﬁeld and Milgrom 2005, Theorem 4) cor-
respondence that always chooses the stable allocation that is most preferred by the
doctors (alternatively, the correspondence that always chooses the stable allocation
that is most preferred by the hospitals) is not monotonic and therefore not Nash
implementable. Next, one can ask how to extend a non-monotonic correspondence
in such a way that it becomes monotonic. Following Sen (1995) and Thomson (1999),
we deﬁne the minimal monotonic extension of any correspondence ψ as the smallest
monotonic correspondence containing ψ, i.e.,
mme(ψ) ≡

{φ | ψ ⊆ φ, where φ is monotonic}.
Hence, the stable correspondence is the minimal monotonic extension of any of its
subcorrespondences.
Finally, we remark that a stronger version of Theorem 2 holds. Instead of requiring
ϕ(R) to only contain Pareto efﬁcient, individual rational allocations, it sufﬁces to
assume that there is at least one Pareto efﬁcient, individual rational allocation in ϕ(R)
for any R ∈ R (see also Kara 1996, Theorems 3 and 5).
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3.2 Nash implementation
A mechanism (for the described implementation environment) is a pair (M,g), where
M :=

i∈N Mi denotes a set of message or strategy proﬁles and g : M −→ A
the so-called outcome function. The outcome function assigns to each strategy proﬁle
an allocation in A. Since g contains all relevant information, we identify a mecha-
nism with its outcome function. A mechanism g together with a preference proﬁle
R induces a non-cooperative game in strategic form, denoted by  (g, R), as follows.
Each strategy proﬁle m ∈ M is mapped to an allocation g(m) ∈ A. These outcomes
of the game are then evaluated using the agents’ preferences at R. Note that the fact
thatpreferencesinourcontextareordinaldoesnotlimitthegametheoreticalanalysis:
either use ordinal preferences at R to compare outcomes or choose a utility represen-
tation u : A −→ Rn (n =| N|) of agents’ preferences at R and deﬁne the payoffs in
 (g, R) by the composition u ◦ g : M −→ Rn.
Mechanism g Nash implements solution ϕ if for all R ∈ R we obtain g(NE( (g,
R))) = ϕ(R),where NE(·)denotestheNashequilibriumcorrespondence.Hence,for
a given preference proﬁle R and any allocation A ∈ ϕ(R) there is a Nash equilibrium
of the induced game  (g, R), the outcome of which is A. Conversely, the outcome of
any Nash equilibrium of  (g, R) belongs to ϕ(R). We say that a solution ϕ is Nash
implementable, if there exists a mechanism that Nash implements it.
Loosely speaking, a mechanism g describes a list of rules for a game in strategic
form.Theserulesareindependentofthetruepreferenceproﬁle.Then,foranypossible
set of agents, represented by their preference proﬁle R, any (desired) allocation in
ϕ(R) can be achieved by strategic interaction in equilibrium, thus can be obtained in
a non-cooperative fashion.
Maskin(1977,1999)showedthataNashimplementablesolutionnecessarilyhasto
be monotonic. However, monotonicity is not a sufﬁcient condition for implementabil-
ity. Moore and Repullo (1990) provide a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for Nash
implementability of a solution. We show that the stable correspondence does satisfy
this condition and hence can be implemented by a version of Maskin’s (1999) mech-
anism (see Moore and Repullo 1990, Appendix).
For any agent i ∈ N, matching market R ∈ R, and subset A  ⊆ A of allocations
let Bi(R,A ) denote the set of “best allocations for agent i in A  with respect to
preference relation Ri”, i.e., Bi(R,A ) :=

A ∈ A  | Ai Ri A 
i for all A  ∈ A 
. Note
that if A ∈ Bi(R,A ) and A  ∈ A  is such that Ai = A 
i then A  ∈ Bi(R,A ). That
means that all best allocations in Bi(R,A ) specify the same (set of) contract(s) for
agent i. Note that A   =∅implies Bi(R,A )  =∅ .
Deﬁnition 1 Condition µ in Moore and Repullo (1990)
A solution ϕ : R  ⇒ A satisﬁes condition µ, if there exists a set B ⊆ A and for each
i ∈ N, R ∈ R and A ∈ ϕ(R) there is a set Ti(R, A) ⊆ B with A ∈ Bi(R,Ti(R, A))




Bi( ¯ R,Ti(R, A)) implies A ∈ ϕ( ¯ R),
(µ2) A∗ ∈ Bj( ¯ R,Tj(R, A)) ∩

i∈N\{j}
Bi( ¯ R,B) implies A∗ ∈ ϕ( ¯ R),




Bi( ¯ R,B) implies A∗ ∈ ϕ( ¯ R).
Moore and Repullo (1990, Theorem 1) show that in the presence of three or more
agents a solution ϕ is Nash implementable if and only if it satisﬁes condition µ.
Theorem 3 If |N|≥3, then the stable correspondence S is Nash implementable.
Proof We show that the stable correspondence S satisﬁes condition µ (Deﬁnition 1),
given R ∈ R and A ∈ S(R), with B = A and Ti(R, A) = Li(Ri, A).L e t ¯ R ∈
R, ( ¯ Ci)i∈N be the associated proﬁle of choice correspondences, and j ∈ N. Then,




Bi( ¯ R, Li(Ri, A)) implies A ∈ S( ¯ R),
(µ2) A∗ ∈ Bj( ¯ R, L j(Rj, A)) ∩

i∈N\{j}




Bi( ¯ R,A) implies A∗ ∈ S( ¯ R).
Step 1: S satisﬁes condition (µ1)









Bi( ¯ R, Li(Ri, A)),
(iii) ¯ R ∈ MT(R, A).
Hence, condition (µ1) is equivalent to monotonicity (see also Moore and Repullo
1990). Thus, Theorem 1 implies that S satisﬁes condition (µ1).
Step 2: A∗ ∈ Bi( ¯ R,A) implies for all X  ⊆ X, ¯ Ci(X  ∪ A∗) = ¯ Ci(A∗) = A∗
i
Let A∗ ∈ Bi( ¯ R,A). Since Bi( ¯ R,A) denotes the set of best allocations for agent i
among all possible allocations A with respect to preference relation ¯ Ri, agent i must
receive the best possible (set of) contract(s) in X. Hence, ¯ Ci(X) = ¯ Ci(A∗) = A∗
i and
for all X  ⊆ X, ¯ Ci(X  ∪ A∗) = ¯ Ci(A∗).
Step 3: A∗ ∈ Bi( ¯ R, Li(Ri, A)) implies ¯ Ci(A∗) = A∗
i
Let i = d ∈ D and A∗ ∈ Bd( ¯ R, Ld(Rd, A)).L e tA  ∈ A be such that A 
d =∅
and for all i ∈ N\{d}, A 
i = A∗
i . Then, A ∈ S(R) (IR) implies that Ad Rd ∅ and
A  ∈ Ld(Rd, A). Thus, since A∗ is a best allocation for doctor d in Ld(Rd, A) with
respect to preference relation ¯ Rd, either A∗
d ¯ Pd ∅ or A∗
d =∅ . Thus, ¯ Cd(A∗) = A∗
d.
Let i = h ∈ H and A∗ ∈ Bh( ¯ R, Lh(Rh, A)).L e tX  ⊆ Ah and A  ∈ A be such
that A 
h = X  and for all i ∈ N\{h}, A 
i = A∗
i . Then, A ∈ S(R) (IR) implies that
Ah Rh X  and A  ∈ Lh(Rh, A). Thus, since A∗ is a best allocation for hospital h in
Lh(Rh, A) with respect to preference relation ¯ Rh, either A∗
h ¯ Ph X  or A∗
d = X . Thus,
¯ Cd(A∗) = A∗
d.
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Step 4: The assumptions in (µ2) as well as the assumptions in (µ3) imply (IR), i.e.,
¯ CD(A∗) = ¯ CH(A∗) = A∗
Let A∗ beeitherasrequiredin(µ2)or(µ3).Hence,foralli ∈ N either A∗ ∈ Bi( ¯ R,A)
or A∗ ∈ Bi( ¯ R, Li(Ri, A)). By Steps 2 and 3, for all i ∈ N, ¯ Ci(A∗) = A∗
i . Hence
¯ CD(A∗) = ¯ CH(A∗) = A∗ and A∗ satisﬁes (IR) in the deﬁnition of stability.
Step 5: The assumptions in (µ2) as well as the assumptions in (µ3) imply (NB),
i.e., there is no hospital h and set of contracts X  ∈ Xh,X    = ¯ Ch(A∗), such that
X  = ¯ Ch(A∗ ∪ X ) ⊆ ¯ CD(A∗ ∪ X )
Let A∗ be either as required in (µ2) or (µ3). Let h ∈ H be such that A∗ ∈ Bh( ¯ R,A)
and X  ∈ Xh with X   = ¯ Ch(A∗) such that X  = ¯ Ch(A∗ ∪ X )[⊆ ¯ CD(A∗ ∪ X )].B y
Step 2, ¯ Ch(A∗ ∪ X ) = ¯ Ch(A∗), which implies X  = ¯ Ch(A∗) – a contradiction.
Let h ∈ H such that A∗ ∈ Bh( ¯ R, Lh(Rh, A)) and X  ∈ Xh with X   = ¯ Ch(A∗)
such that X  = ¯ Ch(A∗ ∪ X ) ⊆ ¯ CD(A∗ ∪ X ). Then, by Step 2, for all i ∈ N\{h},
¯ Ci(X  ∪ A∗) = ¯ Ci(A∗) = A∗
i . Thus, ¯ CD(A∗ ∪ X ) = ¯ CD(A∗) = A∗
h and therefore
X  ⊆ A∗
h.B yS t e p3 , ¯ Ch(A∗) = A∗
h. Hence, ¯ Ch(A∗ ∪ X ) = ¯ Ch(A∗) = A∗
h, which
implies X  = ¯ Ch(A∗) – a contradiction.
Steps 4 and 5 together show A∗ ∈ S( ¯ R) given the assumptions in (µ2) or (µ3).    
Two remarks on Theorem 3 are in order:
First, we did not use any restrictions on hospitals’ preferences in the proof of
Theorem 3. Similarly as before (Theorem 1) we used substitutability of hospitals’
preferences only to guarantee the existence of stable matchings and Theorem 3 is
valid for any other non-empty preference domain for which the stable correspondence
is well deﬁned.
Second, in the implementing mechanism g in Moore and Repullo (1990)t h em a t h -
ematical objects B and Ti(R, A) in Condition µ have an intuitive interpretation. The
allocationsinB areexactlythosethatcanresultfromstrategicinteractioninthemech-
anism. For any A ∈ S(R) let ¯ m be an equilibrium with g( ¯ m) = A. Then Ti(R, A)
contains those allocations that agent i can “enforce” by unilaterally deviating from ¯ m.
Clearly, with Ti(R, A) = Li(Ri, A), neither agent is willing to deviate. The fact that
B can be set to A shows that in the mechanism every allocation can be an outcome of
the mechanism, i.e., it can be achieved through strategic interaction.
Theorem 3 holds as long as there are at least three agents in the market. Let us
brieﬂy turn to the case in which there is exactly one doctor and one hospital. Hence
the matching with contracts model is interpreted as choosing an appropriate contract
between these two agents. We get a negative implementation result as long as we
consider the whole set of possible preference proﬁles.
Theorem 4 Suppose |D|=| H|=1, then S(R) is the set of all Pareto efﬁcient,
individually rational allocations. Moreover, S is not Nash implementable.
Proof Theﬁrststatementdirectlyfollowsfromthestabilityconditions (IR)and(NB).
The set of allocations can be identiﬁed with X ∪{∅}and each Ri consists of all strict
orderings over X ∪{ ∅ } . Substitutability is not a restriction in this case.
123Monotonicity and Nash implementation 405
Note that S is not dictatorial.6 Non-implementability of the stable correspondence
then follows from Theorem 1 in Maskin (1999) (see also Hurwicz and Schmeidler
1978), which states that in an environment with two agents and R containing all strict
preference proﬁles over A, a Pareto optimal solution ϕ that is Nash implementable
necessarily has to be dictatorial. Hence, as S is Pareto efﬁcient and not dictatorial, it
cannot be Nash implementable.    
Remark 1 Theorem 4 crucially relies on the fact that all strict preferences over allo-
cations are contained in R. However, in speciﬁc cases, one can obtain a positive
implementation result for two agents. Suppose, for example, that R contains all pref-
erence proﬁles, in which the empty contract is always ranked least by the doctor as
well as by the hospital. Thus, it is clear from the beginning that employment under
any conditions is better than staying unemployed: a so-called bad outcome exists. As
noted above, the stable correspondence collects all Pareto efﬁcient, individually ratio-
nal allocations. It is easy to see, that S(·) therefore satisﬁes “no veto power”, which
states that allocations that are maximal for n −1 agents at proﬁle R have to belong to
S(R).7 Following Moore and Repullo (1990), this implies a weaker condition called
restricted veto power. Then, by Moore and Repullo (1990, Corollary 3), restricted
veto power in connection with the existence of a bad outcome sufﬁces to show that the
stablecorrespondence isNashimplementable inthetwo-agentcase.Tosum,although
the two agents may be fully informed about each other’s preferences this knowledge
cannot credibly be shared with a third party, as long as we have no restrictions on the
set of possible preference proﬁles. However, if we can take employment for granted,
there is a mechanism that implements the stable correspondence, which then achieves
a Pareto efﬁcient, individually rational allocation through strategic interaction.
4 Conclusion
One of our main results is that in two-sided matching markets with contracts and
more than two agents the stable correspondence is Nash implementable (Theorem 3).
For two agent markets implementability can no longer be established (Theorem 4).
Furthermore, we show that the stable correspondence is monotonic (Theorem 1) and
minimal among all monotonic, Pareto efﬁcient and individually rational solutions
(Theorem 2). As matching markets with contracts comprise a large class of different
types of matching markets our results extend previous Nash implementability results
in more speciﬁc matching markets (e.g., marriage and college admissions markets
as considered by Kara and Sönmez 1996, 1997). This extension is twofold. First,
agents can be matched under different contract conditions where previously only
one contract per match was possible (e.g.,“being matched” was the only available
contract). Second, we extend the preference domain from responsive to substitutable
preferences (an extension that is not trivial and might affect the structure of the set of
stable allocations; see Martínez et al. 1991).
6 Asolutionϕ isdictatorial,ifthereexistsi ∈ N suchthatforall R ∈ R, A ∈ ϕ(R)impliesforall A  ∈ A,
AR i A .
7 For all i ∈ N, R ∈ R,a n dA ∈ A, A ∈

j =i Bj(R,A) implies A ∈ S(R).
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An alternative approach to show implementability of the stable correspondence
S is to show that it satisﬁes essential monotonicity,8 which is a stronger condition
than monotonicity. We could then obtain implementability of the stable correspon-
dence by using Yamato’s (1992) Theorem 2, which states (in our context) that Nash
implementability and essential monotonicity are equivalent.
In contrast to Kara and Sönmez (1996, 1997), Sönmez (1996), or Ehlers (2004),
whorelyonYamato’s (1992)theorem,weapplyMooreandRepullo’s (1990)condition
µ (Deﬁnition 1). Thus, instead of emphasizing that the stable correspondence satisﬁes
a stronger version of monotonicity, we focus on a weak “no veto power” property that
thestablecorrespondencesatisﬁesandthattogetherwithmonotonicityguaranteesthat
stable allocations can be achieved through strategic interaction.9
More precisely, in view of condition µ as used in the proof of Theorem 3, we can
interpret(µ2)inthefollowingway.Supposewehaveastableallocation Aatpreference
proﬁle R. After a change in preferences from R to ¯ R there is an allocation A∗, which
is among the best possible allocation for all agents except agent j. Then, this property
aloneisnotsufﬁcienttoidentify A∗asastableallocationat ¯ R,sinceagent j (say j ∈ D)
mightprefertheemptycontracttohiscontractin A∗ andisalsoabletoenforceit.Since
A was a stable allocation (at R), the empty contract clearly appears in L j(Rj, A). So,
condition (µ2) says that agent j cannot veto against A∗, if he gets his best contract
(at ¯ R) from L j(Rj, A) at ¯ R. In fact, none of the agents except agent j would want to
block A∗ and stability enables agent j in this situation to choose any contract he can
enforceonhisown.Hence,wemainlyneedtheindividualrationalitypropertyofstable
allocations to satisfy (µ2). Condition (µ3) simply describes a unanimity condition
statingthatifthereisanallocationthatisbestforallagents,thenthisallocationshould
be chosen. Clearly, such an allocation satisﬁes individual rationality and no-blocking.
Thus, stability clearly implies the unanimity principle stated in (µ3).
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 2
Proof summary: We start with a stable allocation A for matching market R.I nS t e p1
we change doctors’ preferences at R and obtain a preference proﬁle R  ∈ R such that
R is a monotonic transformation of R  (and vice versa). By Theorem 1, A is stable
for matching market R . In Step 2 we change hospitals’ preferences at R  and obtain
a substitutable preference proﬁle ¯ R such that R  is a monotonic transformation of ¯ R.
Then, R is also a monotonic transformation of ¯ R.I nS t e p3 ,w es h o wt h a tA is stable
for matching market ¯ R. In Step 4, we identify A to be the only Pareto efﬁcient and
individual rational allocation for matching market ¯ R. Hence, A ∈ ϕ( ¯ R). Finally, since
ϕ is monotonic and R is a monotonic transformation of ¯ R, A ∈ ϕ(R) (Step 5).
8 Roughly speaking, an allocation A  ∈ Li(Ri, A) is essential for agent i at preference proﬁle R and
allocation A ∈ S(R) if there exists a proﬁle ˆ R such that A  ∈ S( ˆ R) and Li( ˆ Ri, A ) ⊆ Li(Ri, A). Denoting
by Ei(R, A) the set of essential allocations for i, the stable correspondence S is essentially monotonic if
the following holds: for all A ∈ A, R, ˆ R ∈ R, A ∈ S(R) and Ei(R, A) ⊆ Li( ˆ R, A) imply A ∈ S( ˆ R).
9 A solution ϕ : R  ⇒ A satisﬁes no veto power, if for all i ∈ N we have that A ∈

j =i Bj(R,A)
implies A ∈ ϕ(R), i.e., agent i cannot veto A if it is among the best allocations for any other agent.
123Monotonicity and Nash implementation 407
Proof Let ϕ be a Pareto efﬁcient, individually rational, and monotonic correspon-
dence. Consider a matching market R ∈ R and a stable set of contracts A ∈ S(R).
We need to show that A ∈ ϕ(R).
Step 1: Transforming doctors’ preferences
Let D  ⊆ D denote the set of doctors d  for whom there exists a contract xd  ∈ Xd 
with Ad  Pd  xd  Pd  ∅.
For each doctor d  ∈ D  we deﬁne R 
d  by moving ∅ just below Ad  while not
changing preferences over contracts in Xd , i.e., R 
d  is such that
(i) Ad  P 
d  ∅,
(ii) for no ˆ xd  ∈ Xd , Ad  P 
d  ˆ xd  P 
d  ∅, and
(iii) for all ¯ xd , ˜ xd  ∈ Xd , ¯ xd  P 
d  ˜ xd  if and only if ¯ xd  Pd  ˜ xd .
For all i ∈ N\D , R 
i := Ri. Hence, we obtain matching market R  from R by
transforming preferences of doctors d  ∈ D  according to (i)–(iii). Note that after
transforming the doctors’ preferences, hospitals’ preferences are still substitutable.
Also, note that for all i ∈ N, Li(R 
i, A) = Li(Ri, A). Hence, R is a monotonic
transformationof R at Aand R isamonotonictransformationof Rat A.ByTheorem1
and R  ∈ MT(R, A), A is a stable allocation for matching market R , i.e., A ∈ S(R ).
Particularly, A is individually rational for matching market R .
Step 2: Transforming hospitals’ preferences
Recall that for all h ∈ H, R 
h = Rh. To simplify notation, we will use for all h ∈ H,
Ch instead of C 
h.
Let ˆ H ⊆ H denotethesetofhospitals ˆ h forwhichthereexistsacontract xˆ h,{xˆ h}∈




Pˆ h Y.F o r





For each hospital ˆ h ∈ ˆ H we ﬁx some contract xˆ h such that Cˆ h(A∪{xˆ h}) = Aˆ h and
Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h)  =∅ . Then, deﬁne ˆ Rˆ h as follows. For all Y ∈ Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h) we move Y just
aboveY ∪{xˆ h}whilenotchangingpreferencesoversetsofcontractsinXˆ h\Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h),
i.e., ˆ Rˆ h is such that for all Y ∈ Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h),





(ii) for no Z ∈ Xˆ h, Y ˆ Pˆ h Z ˆ Pˆ h Y ∪{xˆ h}, and
(iii) for all ¯ Z ˆ h, ˜ Z ˆ h ∈ Xˆ h\Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h), ¯ Z ˆ h ˆ Pˆ h ˜ Z ˆ h if and only if ¯ Z ˆ h Pˆ h ˜ Z ˆ h.
Denote the associated choice correspondence for ˆ h ∈ ˆ H at ˆ R by ˆ Cˆ h. Before proving
substitutability of ˆ Rˆ h, we prove the following property of ˆ Cˆ h. For all Z ∈ Xˆ h,
(a) ˆ Cˆ h(Z) = Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h})\{xˆ h},
which means that the set of chosen contracts at the new preference relation ˆ Rˆ h is
obtained from the set of chosen contracts at the original preference relation R 
ˆ h(= Rˆ h)
by deleting contract xˆ h (in case xˆ h was chosen).
Step 2.1: Proof of (a)
Ifxˆ h  ∈ Cˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}),thenCˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}) ⊆ Z andCˆ h(Z) = Cˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}).Furthermore,
xˆ h  ∈ Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}) implies that Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}) ∈ Xˆ h\Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h). Then, (ii) and (iii) in
thedeﬁnitionof ˆ Rˆ h implythat ˆ Cˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}) = Cˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}).Since ˆ Cˆ h(Z∪{xˆ h}) ⊆ Z,
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ˆ Cˆ h(Z) = ˆ Cˆ h(Z ∪{ xˆ h}). Thus, ˆ Cˆ h(Z) = ˆ Cˆ h(Z ∪{ xˆ h}) = Cˆ h(Z ∪{ xˆ h}) = Cˆ h(Z ∪
{xˆ h})\{xˆ h}.
If xˆ h ∈ Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}), then Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h})\{xˆ h}∈Y(xˆ h, Rˆ h). This together with (ii)
and (iii) in the deﬁnition of ˆ Rˆ h implies that ˆ Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}) = Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h})\{xˆ h}. Since
ˆ Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}) ⊆ Z, ˆ Cˆ h(Z) = ˆ Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h}). Thus, ˆ Cˆ h(Z) = Cˆ h(Z ∪{xˆ h})\{xˆ h}.
Step 2.2: Proof of substitutability
Recall that since preferences Rh are substitutable, we have for all h ∈ H,
(SUB) for all X  ⊆ Y  ∈ Xh, X  ∩ Ch(Y ) ⊆ Ch(X ).
We have to show that for all ˆ h ∈ ˆ H,
(  SUB) for all X   ⊆ Y   ∈ Xˆ h, X   ∩ ˆ Cˆ h(Y  ) ⊆ ˆ Cˆ h(X  ).
Let ˆ h ∈ ˆ H and X   ⊆ Y   ∈ Xˆ h. Consider X  ⊆ Y  ∈ Xˆ h such that X  ≡

X   ∪{xˆ h}

and Y  ≡

Y   ∪{xˆ h}

. Then we have
X  ∩ Cˆ h(Y )
(SUB)
⊆ Cˆ h(X )
⇒













(X   ∪{xˆ h}) ∩ Cˆ h(Y   ∪{xˆ h})


\{xˆ h}⊆ Cˆ h

X   ∪{xˆ h}

\{xˆ h}
⇒ X   ∩
	
Cˆ h(Y   ∪{xˆ h})


\{xˆ h}⊆ Cˆ h





⇒ X   ∩ ˆ Cˆ h(Y  ) ⊆ ˆ Cˆ h(X  ),
whichshows   (SUB).Foralli ∈ N\ ˆ H, ˆ Ri := R 
i.Hence,weobtainmatchingmarket ˆ R
from R  bytransformingpreferencesofhospitals ˆ h ∈ ˆ H accordingto(i)–(iii).Wehave
shown that hospitals’ preferences are still substitutable after the transformation. Also,
note that for all i ∈ N\ ˆ H, Li( ˆ Ri, A) = Li(R 
i, A) and for all ˆ h ∈ ˆ H, L ˆ h( ˆ Rˆ h, A) ⊆
L ˆ h(R 
ˆ h, A).Hence, R  isamonotonictransformationof ˆ R at A.Since R isamonotonic
transformation of R  at A, it follows that R is a monotonic transformation of ˆ R at A.
Finally, for all i ∈ N, Ci(A) = ˆ Ci(A) = Ai. Thus, ˆ CD(A) = ˆ CH(A) = A and A is
individually rational for matching market ˆ R.
We repeat the transformation of hospitals’ preferences as long as there exists a











P˜ h Y decreases by one in each iteration.
Step 2.3: Matching market ¯ R
Finally, the transformation of agents’ preferences results in a matching market ¯ R
and an associated proﬁle of choice correspondences ( ¯ Ci)i∈N. Recall that doctors’
preferences at ¯ R are the same as in R . The properties of ˆ R in each iteration induce
thatat ¯ R hospitals’preferencesaresubstitutable, R isamonotonictransformationof ¯ R
at A,and ¯ CD(A) = ¯ CH(A) = A,i.e., Aisindividuallyrationalformatchingmarket ¯ R.
Furthermore, for all hospitals ¯ h and contracts x¯ h ∈ X¯ h such that C¯ h(A ∪{x¯ h}) = A¯ h,
we have that
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Next we prove A is a stable allocation for matching market ¯ R.
Step 3: Proof that A ∈ S( ¯ R)
Suppose, by contradiction, that A  ∈ S( ¯ R). Then, there exists a hospital ¯ h and a set
of contracts ¯ X ∈ X¯ h, ¯ X  = ¯ C¯ h(A), such that ¯ X = ¯ C¯ h(A ∪ ¯ X) ⊆ ¯ CD(A ∪ ¯ X). Since,
¯ CD(A ∪ ¯ X) = CD(A ∪ ¯ X), ¯ X ⊆ CD(A ∪ ¯ X) (recall how doctors’ preferences were
transformed).
Thus, A ∈ S(R)implies ¯ X  = C¯ h(A∪ ¯ X) = A.Hence,forsome ¯ d ∈ D and ¯ x ¯ d ∈ ¯ X\A,
¯ x ¯ d ¯ P¯ d A ¯ d. By the stability of A at matching market R, C¯ h(A∪{¯ x ¯ d}) = A¯ h. Hence, for
¯ X ¯ h ∈ X¯ h by (b),
 ¯ X ¯ h\{¯ x ¯ d}
 ¯ P¯ h ¯ X ¯ h. Since




A¯ h ∪ ¯ X ¯ h

, this constitutes a
contradiction to ¯ C¯ h(A ∪ ¯ X) = ¯ X. Hence, A ∈ S( ¯ R).
Since A ∈ S( ¯ R),i tf o l l o w st h a tA is Pareto efﬁcient for matching market ¯ R.N e x t ,w e
show that allocation A is the only Pareto efﬁcient and individually rational allocation
for matching market ¯ R.
Step 4: Proof that A is uniquely Pareto efﬁcient and individually rational for ¯ R
Suppose, by contradiction, that ¯ A ∈ A, ¯ A  = A, is Pareto efﬁcient and individually
rational for matching market ¯ R.
Suppose there exists ¯ d ∈ D such that ¯ A ¯ d ¯ P¯ d A ¯ d. By the transformation of doctors’
preferences, ¯ A ¯ d P¯ d A ¯ d and ¯ A ¯ d  =∅ .L e t¯ h be the hospital corresponding to ¯ A ¯ d.
Then, since A ∈ S(R), C¯ h(A ∪ ¯ A ¯ d) = A¯ h and by (b),
 ¯ A¯ h\{ ¯ A ¯ d}
 ¯ P¯ h ¯ A¯ h. Thus, in
contradiction to individual rationality of ¯ A for ¯ h at matching market ¯ R, ¯ C¯ h( ¯ A)  = ¯ A¯ h.
Hence, for all d ∈ D, Ad ¯ Rd ¯ Ad.
Supposethereexists ¯ h ∈ H suchthat ¯ A¯ h ¯ P¯ h A¯ h.Since A ∈ S( ¯ R),thereexists ¯ d ∈ D
such that ¯ A ¯ d ∈ ¯ A and A ¯ d ¯ P¯ d ¯ A ¯ d. Thus, by the transformation of doctors’ preferences
∅ ¯ R ¯ d ¯ A ¯ d.I f∅ ¯ P¯ d ¯ A ¯ d, then we have an immediate contradiction to individual rationality
of ¯ A for ¯ d atmatchingmarket ¯ R.Hence,foralld ∈ ¯ D suchthat ¯ A ¯ d ∈ ¯ A and Ad ¯ Pd ¯ Ad,
¯ A ¯ d =∅ . Then, for all d ∈ ¯ D such that ¯ A ¯ d ∈ ¯ A and ¯ A ¯ d  =∅ , ¯ Ad ¯ Rd Ad. This, together
with ¯ A¯ h ¯ P¯ h A¯ h, constitutes a contradiction to the stability of ¯ A at matching market ¯ R.
Hence, for all h ∈ H, Ah ¯ Rh ¯ Ah.
To summarize, for all i ∈ N, Ai ¯ Ri ¯ Ai. Since A  = ¯ A,f o rs o m ej ∈ N, Aj ¯ Pj ¯ Aj.
These facts establish a contradiction to the assumption that ¯ A is Pareto efﬁcient.
Step 5: A ∈ ϕ(R)
Since A istheuniqueindividuallyrationalandParetoefﬁcientallocationformatching
market ¯ R it follows that ϕ( ¯ R) ={A}. Finally, since ϕ is a monotonic solution and R
is a monotonic transformation of ¯ R at A, A ∈ ϕ(R).    
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